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1. INTRODUCTION 
The exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary 
System involves the maintenance of bilateral exchange rates among 
participating currencies within set fluctuation limits. With these 
constraints on exchange rate movements, member countries seek to 
achieve an area of exchange rate stability in a zone characterised by a 
high level of economic integration. Likewise, in joining the EMS, many of 
these countries hoped to enhance the credibility of their anti-inflationary 
policies by absorbing the credibility attained by countries with greater 
price stability. 
This absorption effect, as set forth in Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1988), can facilitate disinflationary processes which would otherwise be 
impossible or would have a much higher cost. In practice, however, it has 
failed to produce very positive results for anti-inflationary credibility 
within the EMS. Weber (1992a), in a study of the cases of seven countries 
which have belonged to the EMS since 1979, reaches the conclusion that 
only small countries benefitted from this effect, and, in Weber (1991), the 
reason is shown to be that these were the only countries which maintained 
a credible exchange rate commitment with respect to the German mark. 
Moreover, as evidenced in the "monetary storm" in the 
autumn of 1992, the sustainability of an exchange rate agreement and, 
consequently, the attainment of the objectives sought in belonging to the 
System depend on the extent to which agents believe that this commitment 
will be upheld. In this sense, there is a very important need to develop 
an indicator of the degree of credibility which agents grant to exchange 
rate commitments and, so far as possible, to ascertain the factors which 
determine the extent of their credibility. 
The concept of credibility which this. paper proposes to study 
refers to the confidence which agents place in the maintenance of an 
exchange rate regime and which must exist if the absorption effect is to 
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be achievedl. This tYPE: of analysis arose in response to the negative 
results of empirical tests on traditional target zone models, whose original 
formulation is found in Kl'ugman (1990), which assumed perfect credibility 
of the exchange rate commitment (see, for example, Flood, Rose and 
Mathieson, 1991, Bertola and Caballero, 1992, and Lindberg and 
Soderlind, 1991, which show the results of a very broad battery of tests 
on the different implications of these models). As underscored in Bertola 
and Svensson (1990), the restrictiveness of this assumption meant that 
the implications of traditional models contradicted observed reality, thus 
giving rise to numerous attempts to test this hypothesis and to quantify 
the risk of an alteration in the commitment implicit in the exchange rate 
zone. 
To measurH the confidence that markets place in the 
maintenance of exchangH rate fluctuation limits at a given point in time, 
the credibility indices most often used in this literature draw on 
information on expected trends in the bilateral exchange rate between two 
currencies, contained in the yield spreads of homogeneous assets 
denominated in the two (!urrencies. In a framework of free international 
capital flow, differentials in the interest rates of homogeneous assets 
issued in two different currencies should be entirely explained by agents' 
evaluation of the uncertainty associated with the bilateral exchange rate. 
In fact, credibility indicators differ precisely in their assumptions 
regarding the characteristics of this evaluation. 
Two indices in particular have been used to study trends in 
the EMS. The first (lel) (Svensson, 1991a, Giovannini, 1990) uses 
information derived from a minimum condition: the inexistence of arbitrage 
opportunities between different currencies. The second approach (lC2) 
1 Therefore, it will not consider the problem of measuring the anti­
inflationary credibili�y of a given economic policy or the existence of an 
absorption effect as a consequence of belonging to the EMS. In Weber 
(1992a), there are numerous references to studies dealing with this 
question which evaluate the existence of the reputation effect, either 
indirectly, through the trade-off between production and inflation, or 
directly, with the measure of concrete definitions of credibility and 
reputation derived from game theory literature applied to economic policy. 
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-suggested in Bertola and Svensson (1991») whose first empirical 
applications are found in Rose and Svensson (1991), Svensson (1991b) 
and Lindberg, Svensson and Soderlind (1991)- attempts to go further 
than simply testing a minimum condition of credibility by explicitly 
evaluating realignment expectations. 
The first goal of this paper is to review those two methods of 
evaluating the credibility of the fluctuation bands of currencies pegged 
to an exchange rate agreement, attempting to analyse their information 
power in the case of the spanish peseta's fluctuation bands within the EMS 
in the period between June 1989 and July 1992. This period, which 
preceded the withdrawal of the British pound and the Italian lira from the 
System and the devaluation of the peseta, was characterised by 
considerable stability in the peseta's exchange l'ate at positions far from 
its maximum depreciation limit. In this way, the sample studied is an 
excellent testing bench for comparing the performance of the most 
frequently used credibility indicators. The paper's second goal is to 
analyse to what extent the evolution of the credibility indicators of the 
peseta's effective fluctuation regime in the EMS ean be explained by news 
related to fundamentals of the Spanish economy. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
approach based on the inexistence of arbitrage opportunities and applies 
it to the case of the peseta. Section 3 covers the same ground with respect 
to the expected devaluation approach, and reinterprets the IC2 index to 
allow an examination of the relationship betwe�m the credibility of the 
peseta's fluctuation regime and the fundamentals of the Spanish economy. 
Section 4 exhibits the findings of the econometric exercise suggested in 
the previous section. Lastly, section 5 presents the principal conclusions 
of the paper. 
2. THE NO ARBITRAGE APPROACH (lCl) 
The first indicator examined in this paper is based on the 
simple assumption that arbitrage opportunities between two different 
currencies do no exist. Thus, if fluctuation bands were perfectly 
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credible, it would not be possible that the interest rate spread at a given 
maturity was such that a non-zero difference existed between the yields 
of both assets converted to a common currency (using for this conversion 
all parities compatible with these fluctuation bands). This event 
establishes, for every maturity, limits to the interest rate spreads, on 
which the credibility indicator is based. 
In order to present a simple illustration of the method, we 
will centre our attention on an analysis of the bilateral fluctuation bands 
between two currencies. Let us call 11("C) and 12(1:) the interest 
rates associated with two homogeneous assets, each issued in a different 
currency with a maturity period 't • Similarly, let s denote the bilateral 
exchange rate2 between the two currencies, expressed in units of 
currency 1 per units of currency 2, S and � , respectively, the 
maximum depreciation and appreciation limits in effect. Thus, if the 
fluctuation bands are per.fectly credible at a maturity 't ,the return on 
the investment in currency 1 (2), converted into units of currency 2 (1) 
at the least favourable exchaI?-ge rate of this currency s<.�) ,cannot be 
higher than the return on the investment in currency 2 (1). 
In other words, it should be tested at any given time and for 
each maturity period 1: that: 
s (1  • i'(-,;) S (1 .1'(-,;» S s (1 • i
'(-,;» (1) 
s s 
In the case of perfect credibility of the fluctuation bands, if 
inequality (1) does not hold agents could obtain, with absolute certainty, 
a positive return with a zero investment. Therefore, if the first (second) 
part of the inequality is not fulfilled, agents could borrow an amount in 
the asset denominated in currency 2 (1) and invest it in the asset 
denominated in currency 1 (2), obtaining, at no cost, a positive return, 
2 This discussion, exc.::ept in the following numerical calculations, does 
not consider the differences between buyer and seller interest and 
exchange rates. For a more detailed study of this method, see, for 
example, Giovannini (19!}O). 
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with probability I. 
Thus, assuming that the prices of the financial assets are 
such that they prevent the existence of arbitrage opportunities, condition 
(1) suggests -given the level of interest rates in country 2- a maximum 
and a minimum level of the interest rate of the asset denominated in the 
currency of country 1, each compatible with the absence of arbitrage 
opportunities. If the interest rate violates these limits at a given 
maturity, it can be concluded that the fluctuation bands are not perfectly 
credible at this maturity. Consequently, for each maturity, it would be 
possible to obtain bands of perfect credibility of each currency in the 
System. Another possible application of the le! approach is to use the 
data on exchange and interest rates at different maturities to determine 
the period t: where inequality (1) is violated. This can be called the 
credibility horizon and it indicates, at any given time, the minimum period 
for which it is certain that the fluctuation band is not completely credible. 
Hence, this indicator provides a synthesis of the information contained in 
the credibility bands constructed for different D1aturities. 
The lel approach has been applied to the Spanish case by 
Rodriguez (1992) an� Serrat (1992), among others'. Their conclusion is 
that the peseta had not violated the minimum conditions of perfect 
credibility with respect to the German mark" fol' terms of less than one 
year during the period studieds. Figures 211 and 2b present the 
evaluations for each of the credibility bands at one year and for the 
3 In general, this approach has been applied to currencies of the EMS 
(Giovannini 1990, Koen 1991) and of Nordic countries (Svensson 1991a, 
Geadah, Saavalainen and Svensson 1992). 
" Throughout this paper, the German mark is used as the currency 
against which credibility is measured, given its important role in the EMS. 
Figure 1 shows the performance of the nominal exchange rate of the peseta 
against the mark. 
5 Serrat (1992) proposes, in addition, a multi-band indicator that 
requires obtaining, for each maturity, the upper and lower limits of 
interest rates, each compatible with the test on condition (1), for the 
peseta's exchange rate against each currency in the EMS. The indicator 
then uses the lowest of the upper limits and the highest of the lower 
limits. 
- 7 -
credibility horizon for the entire period, confirming the above result. 
Moreover, it can be seen that, as of March 1991, the credibility horizon 
did not fall below two years and that, in the period immediately before the 
Danish referendum, it remained at three to four years. 
The leI approach is attractive due to the small number of 
assumptions which it requires, but it provides sufficient and not 
necessary conditions for lack of credibility. The only conclusion drawn 
from a reading of this approach is the presence, at a given period, of a 
lack of unanimity on the sustainability of exchange rate fluctuation limits 
in force. Thus, the credibility band indicates whether, at a given term, 
the probability assigned by the market to a realignment is not zero, 
insofar as the interest rate violates one of the band's limits. However, the 
credibility horizon only signals an upper limit of the term at which the 
market estimates that there is a non-zero probability that a realignment 
will occur which does not, in general, coincide with the term at which the 
market expects a realignment in the System's central parities. 
The information content of leI is broader if the 
interpretation of the indicators rests on the assumption that the 
uncovered interest rate parity theory holds. In this case, interest rate 
differentials simply reflect expected variation in the bilateral exchange 
rates. Thus, the distance of the interest rate to the maximum (minimum) 
limit of the credibility band would indicate the expected distance of the 
exchange rate to its maximum depreciation (appreciation) limit at the end 
of the term considered. Similarly, the credibility horizon would signal the 
term at which the market expects the exchange rate to overshoot the 
appreciation or depreciation limit of the bands in effect. Thus, with this 
additional assumption, the credibility horizon represents a higher limit of 
the term at which the market expects a realignment. However, even 
assuming uncovered intHrest rate parity, the lel indicator does not allow 
an evaluation of the probability, the scale or the timing of possible 
realignments. 
As the above discussion suggests, one characteristic of the 
le! approach is its tendency to overestimate the credibility of exchange 
rate fluctuation limits, insofar as the market considers it feasible for a 
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currency to be realigned before it has fully exhausted the available 
course of depreciation. This constraint has severe consequences when 
analysing the credibility of the fluctuation bands of a currency subject to 
an exchange rate regime, such as the case of the peseta between its entry 
in the EMS in June 1989 until its devaluation in September 1992. In this 
period, the peseta remained stable at positions of appreciation with 
respect to its central parity against the German mark, within a wide 
fluctuation band (:t 6%) which at no time was alter"d. Nonetheless, despite 
the strong stability of the peseta's exchange rate, markets during this 
period demanded a premium on the mark, for all terms, which fluctuated 
between 3 and 7 percentage points at an annual rate. These figures seem 
to suggest that the credibility of the peseta's fluctuation regime was lower 
than indicated by the credibility horizon shown in Figure 2. Indeed, 
markets would not be easily justified in expecting the peseta to run the 
full course of its wide depreciation band before suffering a change in its 
central parity as part of a more or less general realignment. This episode 
seems to make it clear that the minimum condition of lack of credibility 
used in the reI approach may be far from being also necessary. 
3. THE EXPECTED DEVALUATION APPROACH (lC2) 
As we mentioned in the introduction, the second approach 
attempts to go a step further than simply testing a sufficient condition for 
exchange-rate credibility. It explicitly evaluates realignment 
expectations, thereby solving, to a large extent, the problem of lack of 
information content posed by the previous approach6• Naturally, this 
gain in information content is obtained at the expense of increasing the 
restrictiveness of the assumptions used to construct the indicator. First 
of all, it requires the non-existence of risk premia for investment in 
assets denominated in a foreign currency. From this assumption, it 
follows that agents demand the same average return on their investments 
'Weber (1992b) presents a different and more sophisticated empirical 
approach which also manages to give explicit expression to devaluation 
expectations which, drawing on the same data, are very similar to those 
obtained in the references given for this approach. 
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and, therefore, the interest rate differential at a given maturity should 
be the same as the expected depreciation of one currency with respect to 
the other at the same tel'm (theory of uncovered interest rate parity). A 
second assumption caIJs for the exchange rate, in the absence of 
realignments, to remain stationary, with no jumps. This assumption 
implies that any jump in the exchange rate is associated with a change in 
its central parity. Therl�fore, any discrepancy between the interest rate 
differential and the prediction of the stochastic process of the exchange 
rate within the band can be interpreted as an expected jump in the 
exchange rate as the result of a realignment. 
3.1. Formulation of the indicator 
The theory of uncovered interest rate parity implies that the 
expected rate of depreciation of one currency against another, at a given 
term, should be equal to the differential in the interest rate at this 
ml\turity, i. e. : 
(2) 
where e(t) = log (s(t» . 
Now assume that the exchange rate is subject to a risk of 
devaluation (understood as a jump in the exchange rate produced by a 
realignment in the currency's central parity) and that the probability of 
this event is small and, therefore, infrequently observed. Under these 
conditions, expectations of the exchange rate's behaviour at a given term 
will depend on the probability assigned to the occurrence of a devaluation 
in the interval under consideration. In other words, equation (2) can be 
written in the following way: 
[i;(t) -i;(t) 1 = (I-pt(t) )Et (4e(t<t) I ND) +Pt(t)Et(4e(t+t) I D) (3) 
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where D and ND are devaluation and non-devaluation, respectively, and Pt ('t) 
is the probability in t that the devaluation will occur in a term 't . 
Assuming that it is feasible to estimat.e the stochastic process 
of the exchange rate in the absence of a devaluation, it is possible to 
calculate the expected depreciation of the exchange rate under this 
regime. If this expectation is subtracted from thE! observed interest rate 
differential, we obtain an estimator of the expected rate of devaluation, 
which is defined as the product of the probability that the currency will 
be devalued at the rate expected. Formally, it CB_n be written as 
[i;(t)-i/(t)]- E,(boe(t+t) IND) = 
(4) 
= p,(t) [E,(e(t+t) ID) - E,(e(t+t) IND)] 
where the right-hand side of (4) is, precisely, the expected rate of 
devaluation 7. 
7 This formulation is found in literature on the subject (see Lindberg 
et aI, 1991, and Svensson 1991b) in terms X(t+l:) =e(t+t) -c(t+t) , 
where c is the central parity. Thus, the assumption of uncovered parity 
implies: 
E,(boc(t+l:) =i�(t) -< et) -E,(box(t+t» 
which would allow the expected rate of realignment, Et {Ac (t +'t» ,to 
be separated from the expected rate of depreciation within the band, 
E, (box (t +t» . Unfortunately, in general, the process which follows x, 
can only be estimated in the absence of realignments, and, therefore, it 
is only feasible to evaluate, in an explicit way J the term: 
E,(boc(t + t» + p,(t) [E,(x(t + t)/D) - E, (x(t + t)/ND)] 
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To obtain a credibility indicator of fluctuation bands starting 
from this analysis, the theory of uncovered interest rate parity must first 
of all be tested. In the second place, agents must expect a jump in the 
exchange rate if, and only if, there is a realignment in the central parity. 
In these conditions, the expression pt('r) is exactly the probability 
assigned that a realignment in the term 1: will occur and, therefore, the 
right-hand side of (4) will be zero, if and only if this realignment is 
considered impossible. In addition, under the assumptions used, the 
scalar on the right-hand side of (4) offers a precise measure of the 
credibility of the exchange rate commitment, since it comprises the 
probability assigned to the realignment and the expected scale of the 
devaluation. 
The verification of the uncovered parity is not an excessively 
restrictive assumption. Svensson ( 1992) justifies, from a theoretical 
perspective, that the scale of the possible exchange rate risk impedes the 
existence of significant risk premia for reasonable values of the degree of 
risk aversion. Likewise, Ayuso and Restoy (1992) obtain estimations of 
the foreign-exchange risk premia in the EMS which are quite small, due 
to the highly diversifiable nature of exchange rate risk within the 
System. 
However, the identification of expected jumps in the 
exchange rate with rE!alignments in the central parity can be a very 
restrictive assumption, since it eliminates the possibility that expected 
realignments do not neeessarily imply an expected exchange rate jump and 
requires that any sueh jump occur as the result of a central parity 
realignment in the Systems. Whereas the first eventuality tends to 
which is simply an unnecessarily abstruse reformulation of the expected 
rate of devaluation defined in (4). 
e As examples of the possibility that agents do not necessarily 
associate variations in the central parity with variations of equal scale, 
or even in the same direction, in the market exchange rate, we can point 
to the narrowing of the Italian lira's fluctuation band in January 1990 and 
the second devaluation of the peseta in November 1992. In both cases, 
there was a devaluation of the central parity, followed by an appreciation 
of market exchange rates against pre-realignment rates. 
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involve an upward bias in the measure of credibility, the second 
implication of the assumption has the opposite effect. 
3.2. Application to the case of the peseta 
The assumption that associates expected exchange rate jumps 
with devaluations of the central parity is particularly restrictive when 
applied to the case of the peseta. Since the pesetats entry in the EMS, the 
Spanish monetary authority has set an exchange rate fluctuation band of 
:!: 6%. The width of this band allows a certain degree of flexibility in the 
exercise of exchange rate policy which could translate into fairly large 
jumps in the peseta's value without producing a realignment in its central 
parity. In fact, during most of the period s.tudied, the monetary 
authorities managed to keep the peseta's exchange rate against the 
German mark within the lower half of the official fluctuation band. This 
exchange rate policy generated an effective -though not official­
fluctuation regime, which could have been Dlore or less credible 
regardless of whether or not the official exchange rate regime was 
credible. By way of example, expectations of a change to an official 
narrow fluctuation band (:!: 2.25%) at around the same central parity or 
even of a variation in the exchange rate target within the official bands 
in force would pose problems of credibility in the effective fluctuation 
regime, without affecting the confidence in the formal commitment to the 
exchange rate mechanism. 
However, the conventional reading of the IC2 approach does 
not distinguish between formal and effective regiDles, and, in any case, 
uses the right-hand side of (4) as a measure of the credibility of official 
fluctuation bands. Therefore, in the Spanish case, the IC2 approach, as 
applied in the literature on the subject, tends to provide a measure with 
a downward bias of the credibility of the exchange rate commitment. 
Nonetheless, this problem can be surmounted by interpreting the results 
of the application of the IC2 approach as a measure of the credibility of 
the effective fluctuation regime but not of the maintenance of the official 
central parity. 
In this sense, in order to apply the expected devaluation 
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approach to the case of the peseta without incurring the confusion which 
could arise from identi.fying any change in the effective exchange rate 
regime with a realignment in the central parity J we will use the term 
devalorization to express any loss in a currency's value that implies 
abandoning the effective fluctuation regime in force. Thus, we will 
redefine D in (4) as thl� devalorization event which can mean both a jump 
in the market exchang'3: rate within the official fluctuation band, as well 
as a devaluation (realil=nment of the central parity). The right-hand side 
of (4) will then be call,�d the expected rate of devalorization. 
The estimation of the expected rate of devalorization requires 
estimating the behaviour of the exchange rate under its effective 
fluctuation regime. In the case of the peseta, in the period studied, we 
assumed that there was a single effective fluctuation regime, which we 
identified with the sto!:!hastic process of the peseta's exchange rate from 
the time of Spain's entry in the EMS until mid-August 1992. To this end, 
we estimated, through daily observations, the percentage change in the 
exchange rate for terrr.s of 1 month, 3 months, 6 months and 1 year, in the 
period between June 19, 1989 and August 17, 1992. 
A first testable hypothesis is the stationarity of the 
behaviour of the exchange rate of the peseta. Table 1 reports the tests 
of the unit root hypotnesis for the four terms studied. According to the 
Phillips-Perron test, the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit root 
can be rejected, and thus the course of the peseta's exchange rate can be 
characterised as a meE\n reverting process. This result seems reasonable 
for a series with limited fluctuation which is subject to intramarginal 
intervention aimed at ensuring that swings in its parity remain within a 
stable exchange rate target. It is also consistent with the findings for 
other EMS currencies (see Svensson, 1991b, and Franke1 and Phillips, 
1991) and for currendes of Nordic countries (see, for example, Holden 
and Vikoren, 1992). 
Table 1 also shows the results from the univariate estimation 
of the exchange rate process for different terms. In order to improve the 
model's explanatory pJwer, an attempt was made to incorporate non-linear 
effects such as power:; of the level of the (logarithm of the) exchange rate 
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and its distance to the maximum appreciation levl�l, as a proportion of the 
exchange rate level. These variables, whose inclusion was justified by 
theoretical target zone models, did not prove to be significant. The 
estimation uses the generalised least squares (GLS) method, given the 
existence of residual autocorrelation induced by the presence of 
observations with overlapping information (se� Hansen and Hodrick, 
1980) " 
The model estimated for 4e(t +'t) , conditioned on the 
absence of realignments, allows us to obtain immediately an estimator of 
the expectations of exchange rate variation within the band. Thus, 
where (ir and B t are the GLS estimators of the parameters of the 
specified mean reversion model. 
However, the parameters of this type of model are often 
known to lack stability. In order to obtain a more accurate measure of 
exchange rate expectations, we have estimated for each term 't a model 
with time-varging parameters of the form 
de (t+<) = a' (t) + B' (t) e (t) ;" U (t+<) (5) 
where u (t +t) follows a moving average process induced by the use of 
daily data and the parameters follow a randclm walk process. The 
estimation was reached by applying the Kalman filter on the spae-state 
specification of the model. The details of this procedure are given in 
Appendix 1. 
In accordance with expression (5), the expectations of a 
depreciation in the exchange rate are given by the expression 
E, [de (t+<) I = ii' (t) + B' (t) e (t) 
where (ir(t) and at(t) are the Kalman filter estimates. To obtain the 
expected rates of devalorization, all that is nec3ssary is to subtract, 
according to (4), these expectations from the intHrest rate differential. 
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Figures 3a to 3d show the estimations of the expected rate of 
devalorization for models with time-varying parameters. Likewise, 
confidence intervals of 95% are included for these estimations. The data 
suggest that the peseta's effective fluctuation regime faced problems of 
credibility at 1 month during the first few weeks after joining the EMS, 
in the first half of 1990 and in the first half of 1991. If the term is 
lengthened to 3 months, the episodes of lack of credibility also encompass 
the final weeks of 1990, and, at 6 months, the last quarter of 1990 must 
be added. Finally, it cannot be rejected (with a 5% level of significance) 
that, during nearly all of 1989 and 1990, the effective regime of the 
peseta's fluctuation was not credible at 1 year. 
Thus, not surprisingly, the longer the term the more 
frequent the episodes of lack of credibility. In most of the sample, the 
effective exchange rate regime was perceived by agents as sustainable in 
the very short run, but. not in the medium and long run. In addition, the 
shorter the term the greater the variability of the expected rate of 
devalorization. This is congruent with the hypothesis that the degree of 
credibility in the very short run is related to the response of agents to 
rumours of changes in (!conomic policy and other events that induce very 
abrupt and frequent changes in agents' expectations. This perception is 
also confirmed, as shown later in section 4, by the different extent to 
which (milder) trends in the fundamentals of the Spanish economy explain 
the degree of credibility of the exchange rate regime at different terms. 
Naturally, under a conventional reading of the IC2 approach, 
Figures 3a to 3d would be considered a reflection of the expected rates of 
devaluation of the peseta at different future dates. Under these 
conditions, the evaluation of the credibility of the official exchange rate 
regime would be blatantly inferior to that deduced from let. However, as 
we have indicated, an expected positive rate of devalorization does not 
imply the existence of E!xpectations of the currency's devaluation. Thus, 
the measure of credibility of the official regime offered by IC2 would have 
a downward bias insofar as agents may expect a modification in the 
effective exchange rate but not necessarily a realignment of central 
parities. 
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Once devalorization expectations h9.ve been calculated, the 
next step is to explain how these expectations are formed and, more 
concretely, to estimate the contribution of variables that reflect the 
exchange rate's fundamentals. This analysis allows us to identify the 
causes behind the lack of credibility of the effective fluctuation regime. 
4. DETERMINANTS IN THE CREDIBILITY OF THE EFFECTIVE 
FLUCTUATION REGIME OF THE PESETA 
This section examines to what extl!nt the expected rate of 
devalorization estimated in the previous section is explained by changes 
in the fundamentals of the Spanish economy. 
It seems logical to infer that the erosion of confidence in the 
sustainability of the peseta's effective fluctuation regime was largely the 
result of the imbalances that characterised the Spanish economy during 
the period studied. It is not our intention, however, to explain a large 
percentage of devalorization expectations in terms of fundamentals. In the 
first place, foreign exchange markets are highly sensitive to rumours of 
economic policy changes which are not subsequently confirmed, and, 
therefore J the generation of self-fulfilling expectations is the rule rather 
than the exception. Moreover, trends in the credibility of the peseta's 
exchange rate regime are closely related to the g(meral course of economic 
integration in Europe. The latter variable is not easily measured, and is 
only partially correlated to the fundamentals of the involved economies. 
Finally J the impact of the deterioration in a given imbalance on exchange 
rate credibility is often ambiguous. A rise in the rate of inflation, for 
example, may lead agents to perceive as less �;ustainable the effective 
exchange rate regime if they consider the implied loss of competitiveness 
to be excessive; or agents may consider that exchange rate policy, as in 
the case of Spain, is a fundamental tool in curbing inflation and, 
therefore, an increase in the inflation differential makes it more necessary 
and, consequently, more credible to maintain a strong peseta, in line with 
the exchange rate regime studied here. This ambiguity of the effect on 
de valorization expectations applies also to variables that measure fiscal 
and monetary imbalances. 
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Naturally, both the problem of self-fulfilling expectations and 
the ambiguity of the effects of deterioration in macroeconomic imbalances 
have a lesser probability of arising when the terms of the expectations are 
lengthened. Therefore, in principle, it is convenent to perform the 
econometric analysis for different terms. 
Table 2 summarises the findings of the estimation of a model 
under which devaloriza1ion expectations are formed at terms of 1 month, 
3 months, 6 months and 1 year. In each case, the dependent variable is 
the monthly average of the expected rate of devalorization, obtained from 
the exchange rate model with variable parameters estimated in the 
previous section. This rate can be characterised in all cases by a 
stationary process around a determinist trend. Thus, all specifications 
include a deterministic trend as a regressor. In addition, this trend is a 
reasonable proxy for the gains in credibility associated with the progress 
towards monetary union 9 which occurred in the period studied. 
The macroeconomic variables chosen were the inflation 
differential vis-a-vis Germany, the current account balance, variations 
in the unemployment rate, changes in the Banco de Espaiia's foreign 
currency re�erves, deviations in the money supply with respect to the 
budget target and the general government balance1o• All variables were 
seasonally adjusted and conveniently lagged in order to ensuring, that 
they belonged to the agents I information set at the time when their 
expectations were measured. Details of the definition and construction of 
the series are given in Appendix 2. 
As Table 2 shows, the estimations required including two time 
lags of the dependent variable in order to capture the remaining 
persistence of the dependent variable. Obviously, this fact reflects either 
9 This interpretation is, of course, more accurate in the period prior 
to the Danish referendum. Similarly, an attempt was made to measure 
progress towards monetnry union in terms of the differential in interest 
rates at 5 years, expeeted in 5 years I time, implicit in Spanish and 
German yield curves. This variable did not prove significant in 
specifications in which a trend was included. 
10 Budget and foreign deficits were measured in terms of GDP. 
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a similar dynamic influence of the regressors on the dependent variable 
or the simple and very probable omission of relevant explanatory 
variables. 
The findings are quite striking. No variable used has a 
significant influence on the formation of devalol'ization expectations at 1 
month. This result is consistent with the idea that in the short run these 
expectations are affected by variables unrelated to the fundamentals of 
the economy and/or that markets expect the authorities to react by 
tightening exchange rate policy when fiscal and monetary imbalances 
worsen. 
For terms of more than 1 month, the results are more 
conclusive. The current account deficit significantly affects 
devalorization expectations at all terms. This significance proved to be 
very robust to changes in the specification of the model11• The inflation 
differential with Germany and, to a lesser extent, the unemployment rate 
have a positive and significant effect (at the 95!k confidence interval) on 
the expected rate of devalorization at 3 and 6 months, but vanish at 1 
year. 
Results for the rest of the variables, Le. variation in 
• 
reserves, deviations from money supply targets and the budget deficit, 
show no significance and, sometimes, perverse signs. 
Thus, results seem to suggest that the market grants an 
important role to costs associated with the loss of competitiveness of the 
Spanish economy when it evaluates the sustainability of the peseta's 
effective fluctuation regime. The basic indicators of these costs seem to 
be the performance of the current account balance and, to a lesser 
degree, differentials in inflation and the rate of unemployment. 
The lack of significance of the rest of the variables is not 
particularly surprising. In the first place, it is reasonable to believe that 
11 This is also the variable with the most clearcut effect in the case of 
the Swedish krona, studied in Lindberg, Svensson and Soderlind (1991). 
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variations in reserves do not have a symmetrical effect, Le. that they 
only play an important role insofar as they fall below a given level. 
Moreover, it seems sensible that credibility problems so induced are 
greater the further they are from this minimum. All of this would lead to 
a non-linear effect that does not exist in the sample used, where reserves 
not only remained at considerably high levels but also tended to increase. 
In the second place, the non-significance of deviations from 
money supply targets could be partly justified by the problem of 
sign-ambiguity mention earlier. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that 
agents consider this variable to have scant information content with 
respect to the character of monetary policy, given the importance of its 
endogenous component, within a context of international financial 
integration and the greater attention paid to exchange rates in setting 
targets. Lastly, the budget deficit's lack of influence on the credibility 
of the peseta's effective fluctuation regime may also be related to the 
period studied, since Spain's fiscal imbalance did not reach worrisome 
figures until the last stretch of the sample. 
Of course, insofar as there is no structural model of the 
formation of expected alterations in the effective exchange rate regime 
and given the lack of a sufficiently broad sample, the above-mentioned 
results do not provide the framework for a very robust inference 
analysis. Moreover, the estimations themselves signal that these 
expectations, in the case of the peseta, contained a large inertia 
component associated with variables unrelated to the performance of the 
Spanish economy. However, the results do suggest that, in tandem with 
these elements, the fundamentals of the economy have a significant 
influence, at least in the medium term, on the credibility of its exchange 
rate regime. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The turmoil in foreign exchange markets in the last third of 
1992 made it very clear that the lack of confidence of agents active in 
financial markets can have an enormous impact on an exchange rate 
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regime. This underscores the importance of eXamIOlng the available 
analytical capacity to evaluate the credibility of exchange rate regimes 
and to ascertain the determinants in the degree of sustainability that 
markets assign to a given exchange rate mechanism. 
The most widely applied measures of credibility of an 
exchange rate regime preferentially use information on market 
expectations of exchange rate trends contained in interest rate 
differentials, on the assumption on the assumption of absence of arbitrage 
opportunities in the international capital markets. This simple assumption 
gives rise to a first indicator, which consists of obtaining the maturity at 
which existing interest rate differentials imply that markets expect a 
currency's exchange rate to overshoot the limits set. Unfortunately, this 
indicator loses its information power insofar as changes in fluctuation 
bands may arise, as past experience shows, before a currency has run 
the full course of its fluctuation limits. 
A second and more ambitious indicator of credibility provides 
an explicit evaluation of a currency's expected rate of devaluation, 
understood as the product of the probability that such a devaluation will 
occur, by its expected size. Unfortunately, this second approach only 
indicates the credibility of official fluctuation bands, based on an 
assumption which is in general not acceptable, Le. it identifies any 
change in the effective exchange rate fluctuation regime with a 
realignment in the central parity. This measuI'f� would, therefore, have 
an upward bias as long as the market may consider feasible a devaluation 
that does not alter the observed market exchange rate, and a downward 
bias if jumps can arise which are unrelated to a change in central parities. 
The peseta provides a particularly interesting case for 
comparing the information power of these indices. In the period 
immediately after the sample studied, the peseta came under heavy 
speculative attack, despite a record of strong stability throughout its 
first three years in the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS and ranking, 
during nearly the entire period, as the strongest currency in the System. 
The peculiarity of the peseta lies in the coexistence, over the same 
period, of an appreciated and relatively stable exchange rate in a wide 
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fluctuation band and rugh interest rate differentials in annual terms, 
which at no time overshot the distance of the market exchange rate to the 
maximum depreciation limit. 
The combination of these elements provides us with high 
credibility indices undel" the first approach and low indices under the 
second. This is the consequence of observing interest rate differentials 
which were insufficient to indicate expectations of the peseta's running 
the course of its broad margin of depreciation in the short term, but 
which were sufficient for detecting expectations of a larger loss in the 
value of its exchange rate than what could be inferred from its 
performance since joining the EMS. 
However, since there is no way to guarantee that agents will 
identify this expected devalorization with a devaluation, we are forced to 
reinterpret the results of the application of the second indicator as a 
measure of the credibility of the peseta's effective 'fluctuation regime, 
understood as the confidence of markets that its exchange rate will 
continue to behave as it did in the period studied . The analysis proves 
particularly interesting if we consider that the peseta's effective regime 
was the result of a specific exchange rate policy, whose objectives went 
beyond merely maintaining its parity within official bands. 
The results obtained show that the peseta's effective 
fluctuation regime experienced episodes of lack of credibility at terms 
ranging between 1 month and 1 year, mostly in periods prior to the 
signing of the draft treaty of Economic and Monetary Union at Maastricht 
and subsequent to the Danish referendum. This lack of credibility should 
be understood in the sense expressed in the previous paragraph and, 
therefore, it does not necessarily imply an expectation of devaluation in 
the central parity. 
The final pal't of this paper studies the determinants in the 
credibility of the peseta's effective fluctuation regime . The results show 
that credibility was marked by a strong trend component -- which was 
unrelated to trends in the imbalances of the Spanish economy and 
operated in just the opposite direction of these -- as well as by another 
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substantial inertia-type component . Moreover , in shorter terms , there 
was no indication that the fundamentals of the Spanish economy had any 
significant effect on the degree of credibility of the peseta's effective 
fluctuation regime . However, in longer terms (more than 1 month) , the 
current account deficit and , to a lesser extent, the inflation differential 
with Germany and variations in the unemployment rate were important 
factors in explaining the dependent variable . In turn, variables such as 
the general government deficit , deviations from money supply targets and 
variations in the central bank's foreign reserves showed no significance. 
Thus, the findings are compatible with the hypothesis that 
credibility -- particularly in the short run -- is largely explained by 
reactions to unconfirmed rumours , self-fulfillini� expectations and other 
types of variables which are difficult to measure nnd which are essentially 
unrelated to the real state of the economy . FurthElrmore , it would not seem 
unreasonable to interpret the significance of the trend variable 
introduced in the estimation of the model as a consequence of the System's 
greater general stability and of the advances towards monetary union, 
which occurred during a large part of the sample and allowed the Spanish 
economy to enhance the credibility of its exchange rate regime . 
Nonetheless, in the medium term, markets had certain reserves as to the 
sustainability of the peseta's effective exchange rate regime , as a result 
of their evaluation of the costs associated with the Spanish economy's loss 
of competitiveness. These costs seem to be weighed primarily in terms of 
the performance of the external balance and, marginally, on the basis of 
inflation and unemployment differentials . 
Lastly, we should add a word of caution regarding the 
interpretation of the results of the final part of this paper. By the very 
nature of this type of empirical study, it is very difficult to extrapolate 
the findings beyond the sample itself. Once the regime has changed , the 
relative influence of each of the fundamentals and of the inertia and trend 
components is not likely to remain unaltered . 
By way of a final conjecture , it is very possible that , in the 
aftermath of the turbulence in the EMS and due to the uncertainty 
surrounding the future of the monetary union and even of the course of 
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the imbalances in the Spanish economy, fundamentals will play a greater 
role in determining the credibility of the peseta's effective fluctuation 
regime, since the absorption effect from other countries will be smaller. 
Consequently, despite the devaluations suffered by the peseta, the 
Spanish economy in general will probably have to accept a stronger dose 
of discipline than during the first three years of Spaints membership in 
the EMS if the peseta is to regain its previous levels of credibility. 
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APPENDIX 1 :  MODEL WITH TIME-VARYING PARAMETERS 
Parameters a and B in the process which follows the 
(logarithm of the) exchange rate within the fluctuation band were allowed 
to vary over time, in the following way: 
where : 
�t = -&'" + v t t-l t 
&" = [0' B'J t t '  t 
, = 21 , 65 , 131 Y 263 
t = 1. . .  T 
t = 1 .  . .  T 
t 1 .  . .  T 
(A2 .1)  
(A2 . 2) 
(A2.3) 
The set of equations (A2. 1 ) ,  (A2 . 2) and (A2.3) can be 
written in the space-state form: 
- 25 -
where : 
(a) 
(b) 
where the 
(c) 
whereby: 
6" 1 S 
R 
t = 1 • • .  T 
t 1 • . .  T 
Zt [ 1 ,O,O . . .  O , 1 , et 1 1x(r+3)  
( = [6' , 6' . . .  6' , a', B'] ot It rt t t l x { r +l) 
terms are auxiliary parameters. 
''h - N (0, a: R E RI ) 
1 0 0 
1 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 1 0  
O O l ( r + l) x l  
[1 0 0 ) 
y E = 0 Qll Q12 
o Q21 Q22 1 x 3 
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(A2.4) 
(A2.5) 
(d) 
T 
(e) 
S, 
o 1 0 0 
0 0 1  0 
o 0 0 1 
: : : : 
: : : : 
o 0 0 0 
o 0 0 0 
o 0 0 0 
o 0 0 0 
,+1 0 
0 , 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
o 0 0 
0 0 0  
0 0 0  
: : 
: : : 
1 0 0  
o 0 0 
0 1 0  
0 0 1  ( r +J ) x ( r +J )  
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
POll Pou 
P012 P022 (r+J)x{r+3)  
(A2 .4) is the model's measure equation, whereas (A2 . 5 )  is its 
transition equation. The time-varying parameters can now be estimated 
by applying the Kalman filter (see Harvey , 1981 ) , taking given values for 
6� J Po and Q . 
In this paper, we took the efficient estimates of at and nt 
in the model with constant parameters as initial values a� and B� 
whereas we set Of = 0 . Likewise, we took P = Q and restricted Q to be � 0 
diagonal with Q11 = 16 · Q" 
12 . Lastly, we tried with different values 
for Q22 without causing any substantial change in the overall results . The 
results presented in the text relate to the case Q22 = 2- . The estimated 16 
parameters are shown in Figures 4a to 4d. 
12 Restriction derived from the comparison the variation range for 
B (from - 2 to O) with the range for derived from the fluctuation bands 
for the exchange rate Pta/DM (approximately - 4 to 4) . 
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APPENDIX 2: DATA m:SCRIPTION 
The data or interest rates and exchange rates are daily 
observations between June 19,  1989 and August 17 J 1992, obtained from 
the data base of the Research Department of the Banco de Espafta . As 
usual in this type of study, the interest rates were Euromarket deposit 
rates, since the assets traded on this market can be considered 
homogeneous , except for the currency in which they are denominated .  
All macroeconomic variables used were adjusted for time lags, 
thus ensuring that they belonged to the information available at the time 
when agents I expectations were formed .  The frequency was monthly (June 
1989-July 1992) , except in the case of GDP, which used estimations based 
on quarterly series (source: Office of Economic Studies , Banco de 
Espaiia) divided by three to arrive at monthly figures . The other 
variables used are described below: 
1 .  Central reserves of the Banco de Espaiia : convertible currencies, 
plus ecu in the EMCF ,  less the provision for valuation differences 
in external assHts, less valuation differences in assets in the 
EMCF, each of which are recorded under separate entries in the 
balance sheet of the Banco de Espafia (source: Boletin Estadistico, 
Banco de Espaila , Tables 4 . 1 1  and 4 . 12 ) .  This variable was lagged 
one period. 
2 .  External deficit : current account balance on a cash basis , as a 
percentage of GDP. Source: Boletin Estadistico , Banco de Espaiia, 
Table 17 . 1 .  This variable was lagged 2 periods. 
3 .  Inflation differential : logarithmic difference in Spanish and German 
consumer price indices. Source: Boletin Estadistico J Table 25 . 1 ,  
and data base of the Research Department of the Banco de Espaiia. 
This variable was lagged 1 period . 
4 .  Deviation from monetary targets: (log) difference in the monthly 
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level (average of daily data) of "liquid Assets" (ALP) with respect 
to the monthly target level, obtained from the annual growth target 
vis-a.-vis December of the previous year. Seasonally adjusted 
series , as explained in the economic bulletins of March 1989, April 
1990 , February 1991 and February 1992, were used. This variable 
was lagged one period. 
5 .  Budget deficit (as a percentage of GDP) : first difference of the 
following stock variables : domestic loans to the general 
government, special debt held by residents ,  firm orders for 
medium- and long-term debt held by the public, and government 
securities of all terms held by non-residents. This was used as a 
proxy for the budget deficit , since it is the only available 
seasonally adjusted candidate and given the lack of confidence that 
simple seasonally adjusted methods used for the other variables 
could reflect the irregular seasonal structure of the difference in 
public expenditure and revenuelJ • This variable was taken as the 
semi-sum of the observations in t-2 and t-3.  
6.  Unemployment rate: registered unemployment ( source: National 
Employment Office) divided by the total labour force (source: 
working popUlation survey) . The latter is obtained by dividing the 
quarterly figure by three . This variable was used as the semi-sum 
of the observations in t-l and t-2, for registered unemployment , 
and t-5 for the labour force. 
In the case of non-seasonally adjusted variables , the 
regression residuals of these variables, based on seasonal dummy 
variables, was used. 
13 See Cabrero and Sanchez (1992 ) .  
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Table 1 
MODEL FOR THE PESETA/MARK 
EXCHANGE RATE 
Ae (t+<) = a + II e (t) + u(t+<) 
1 month 3 months 6 months 1 2  months 
1 . 03 4 . 30 3 . 86 3 . 68 
( . 15 )  ( . 16) ( . 17) ( . 20) 
(l - . 25 -1 . 04 - . 93 - . 89 
( . 04 )  ( . 04 )  ( . 04 )  ( . 05 )  
R' . 1 3  .44 .60 . 62 
0 . 009 . 014 . 015 . 01 1  
pp 0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
N 731 691 634 518 
NOTES: 
GLS estimations using the theoretical matrix of variances and 
covariances (see Hansen and Hodrick, 1980 ) .  
Standard errors figure in parenthesis . 
pp is the P value in the Phlllips-Perron test on unit roots . 
e is the logarithm of the Pta/Mark exchange rate. 
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